At the 1990 EuroCrypt Conference, Niemi proposed a new publickey cryptosystem based on modular knapsacks. Y.M. Chee in Singapore, A. Joux and J. Stern in Paris independently found that this cryptosystem is insecure. Our two cryptanalytic methods are slightly different, but they are both based on the LLL algorithm. This is one more example of a cryptosystem that can be broken using this powerful algorithm.
Introduction
Let p be a prime and denote by Z / p Z the field of integers modulo p . Unless otherwise stated, all vectors shall be assumed to be column vectors. The MODULAR IOJAPSACK problem is defined as follows:
The Proposed Cryptosystem
We briefly review Niemi's public-key cryptosystem in this section. The basic idea is a notion of absolute values in Z / p Z . The absohte value 1st
of g E Z / p Z is the minimum of the least non-negative residues modulo p of the two integers g and -g . We call g k-small if 1st 5 k and g klarge if 191 2 rp/21 -k. We typically speak of small and large numbers, thus leaving k unfixed. The construction of the cryptosystem .is as follows. Fix a prime p , and positive integers n and k << p. We randomly select matrices C, D , S E (Z/pZ)""" with k-small entries, a non-singular matrix R E ( Z / p Z ) " " " , and a diagonal matrix A E ( Z / p Z ) n x n with k-large entries. The public information is p and the n x 2n matrix E = ( A B ) ? where
The private key is R. The matrices C, D, S, and A should also be kept secret but they are not needed after the initial construction. The message space is
and the ciphertext space is C = {c E ( Z / P Z )~) . 
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The decryption rule for T ; , 1 5 i 5 n, does not always yield the correct plain bits since its correctness depends on the size of the entries of
Niemi restricts himself to the case S = I , where I denotes the identity matrix, and claims that in this case, the sufficient condition to ensure correct decryption is p > 4kn. Niemi also claims that k = 1 is a good choice.
In the sequel, we show how the plaintext can be recovered from the ciphertext without the knowledge of the secret key R.
The Cryptanalytic Principle
An integer lattice L of dimension m is an additive subgroup of 2" that contains m linearlv independent vectors over R" (hence rn 5 n ) . An ordered basis (q, . . . , -1 : . ) of a lattice L, of dimension rn is a list of elements of 1: 
C(V).
The main idea behind the attacks we are going to describe is the following. It is well-known that the LLL algorithm [LLL82] is a polynomial time algorithm designed to find a short (non-zero) vector in an integer lattice. More precisely, if the dimension of the lattice is n, then the LLL algorithm can find a vector in the lattice whose length is no more than 2("-')/' times the length of the shortest vector in the lattice. In particular, if the length of the shortest vector in the lattice is %(n-1)/2 times smaller than that of the other vectors, then the LLL aIgorithin will find the shortest vector. In practice, the LLL aigorithm is much more effective and finds vectors whose lengths are much smaller than that gauranteed by the theoretical bound; and other algorithms exist, that are even more powerful [ScESl] . In our attacks, we transform the problem of finding the plaintext to that of finding short vectors in certain lattices. Then we show that the short vector is much shorter than the average short vectors. This gives heuristical evidence that the short vector can be found in polynomial time. a reasonably short vector in C. Given an ordered basis of a lattice, the LLL algorithm computes another ordered basis, containing relatively short vectors, for the lattice. This new ordered basis is called a reduced basis. Our hope is that by running the LLL algorithm on the lattice L, the vector we are looking for appears in the reduced basis. Unfortunately, because the last n components of u may be large, such a vector is often too long to appear in any reduced bases. In order to remedy this situation, we adopt the following strategy. zero. This provides heuristical evidence that the vector v(x) appears in the reduced basis for C ( H ) with high probability. It is also interesting to remark that there are other vectors which may provide a decryption of c, since they increase the probability of finding x. Let us explain informally what these vectors arc, and why they are useful. First, we can say that summing up a few small numbers gives a small number (with a different constant k of course) and that summing up a few large numbers can give either a small number or a large number, depending on the parity of the number of numbers we sum up. Thus, if we obtain in the reduced basis a short vector of the form , where p is a small odd number, we can 21 1 write E(,ua: -z') = 0 and thus, if p x -2' is small enough, we can infer that the first n components of this vector are ail even, and therefore that the first n components of z and x' have the same parity.
Conclusion
The previous sections gave heuristical evidence that Niemi's proposed publickey cryptosystem is not secure. We would.li1~e to remark that it gets less and less secure. The reason for this is that a recent improvement of attacks against low-density knapsacks [CLJSl] can be used to improve the attacks described here. The idea is to replace the identity part of the basis matrices as described in [CLJSl] . We plan to carry out systematic experiments with this improved version.
